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Tuesday, November 21, 2023

OPERATION LORRAINE 

29th October - 8th November 1952

Salan Strikes At Giap's Supply Lines

Operation Lorraine : Salan Strikes At Giap's Supply Lines (free.fr)


                 



General Raoul Salan took over from the ailing De Lattre in January 1952, and set about extricating his forces from the Hoa Binh area. This important base had been recaptured by the paras in Operation Tulip (15th November 1951 - the last operation using Ju52 aircraft), but had proven difficult and costly to maintain (5 battalions held the position against heavy VM pressure, but another 4 were required to keep supply lines open). Having cleared the road during late January (using 12 battalions with heavy support), Salan ordered a withdrawal. During late February, a "leap-frog" retreat down RC6 proved bloody, as the CFEO experienced sophisticated VM tactics utilising concealed artillery and AA guns. Once back in the Delta, the war in Tonkin seemed to have reached something of a stalemate. The "De Lattre Line" was holding, apparently keeping the Red River Delta free of VM.

It was not until the monsoon ended in October that activity heated up again. Giap sent the 308, 312 and 316 Divisions south-west into the Thai Highlands, towards Laos. Their first target was the French position at Nghia Lo, a ridge between the Black and Red Rivers, together with attacks on Gia Hoi and Van Yen. Despite initial fierce resistance by the Vietnamese garrison, Nghia Lo fell to "human wave" assault by the 308 Div on 17th October, and the other garrisons in the area fell back on the Black River - they were saved from destruction by the sacrifice of 6e BPC, who were dropped at Tu Le as a blocking force, suffering great losses. (Though Gia Hoi, which had been surrounded by the 312 Division since 15th October, was successfully relieved and evacuated by the paras). Many of the CFEO troops reached Na San, where a fortified base (supplied by airlift) was quickly established as the only viable position in the area. But, suddenly, all of north-west Tonkin and the Laos border area was open to the VM.

Salan had regarded the Nghia Lo attacks as a diversion (expecting a VM attack on the Delta once he had committed reserves). When this did not occur, he decided to launch an offensive into the Viet Bac north of the Delta. He expected Giap to react by withdrawing from the Black River, at which point a set-piece battle in the VM heartland would not only weaken Giap militarily, but also would reduce their credibility with the local populace. The Nghia Lo position could then be regained, and the VM kept out of Laos.

To carry out this audacious plan (which was, after all, a serious gamble), Salan decided to strike along the line of the Clear River and RC2, and assembled a force of 30,000 troops (the largest French concentration yet seen in Indochina) to do so. These included four Groupes Mobiles, two Sous-Groupments Blindés (1er Chasseurs and 8e RSA) and a Dinassaut (DNA 12) on the Clear River. The operation was given the codename "Lorraine".

The land forces assembled at two jumping-off points: Trung Ha on the Red River, north-west of Son Tay, and Viet Tri on the Clear River to the north-east, and advanced on the 29th October, aiming to link up at Phu Tho (some 32km/20 miles to the north). However, VM regional troops fought strong delaying actions and the link-up did not occur until 5th November. The lack of "mainforce" opposition did raise CFEO confidence, and they set off deeper into the jungle highlands.

On 9th November, 2,350 paratroopers of 3e BPC, 1er BEP and 2e BEP dropped on a rough DZ near the VM supply-base at Phu Doan (Operation Marion), and armoured units of GM 1 and 4 moved up RC2 to relieve them, with support from the marines of the Dinassaut. In this phase of the operation, the French captured a haul of VM supplies (precise details vary - see below) including 4 Soviet-made Molotava trucks (which surprised their intelligence service!). From Phu Doan, the main CFEO force advanced to Phu Yen, while strong patrols were sent out along the roads north (to Tuyen Quang) and west (to Yen Bay), setting up blocking positions against the expected VM counter-attack.

But where was Giap during this French assault? That wily general had, in fact, decided to bluff it out and hold his positions on the Black River. Fully expecting the CFEO to outrun its supply lines, he sent only two regular VM regiments (one each from the 308 and 316 Divisions) towards Yen Bay from the Black River, and simultaneously ordered the two Divisions surrounding the Red River Delta (304 Division to the north, 320 Division to the south) to increase their guerrilla activity and thus encourage Salan to withdraw the "Lorraine" forces.

By mid-November, Salan realised that Operation Lorraine had failed in its objectives. Giap's mainfoce had not been brought to battle, and the CFEO was now garrisoning a useless finger of land pointing into VM territory. The air supply system was already overstretched, and convoys by road or river were proving costly in the face of ambushes by VM regional forces. Therefore, on 14th November Salan gave the order to withdraw behind the De Lattre Line.

This initially went smoothly, but on the 17th November, the two VM regular regiments that Giap had sent back were in the Phu Doan - Phu To area, and 36th VM Regiment (from the 308 Division) set up a large-scale ambush at the Chan Muong gorge, where RC2 wound through a steep-sided, jungle defile - only 150m wide at best. When a French convoy consisting of units from GMs 1 and 4 (BMI, II/2e REI, 4e BM/7e RTA, RICM tanks) entered, heavy mortar fire stopped them, and infantry assault caused serious losses in two heavy ambushes. Only furious action by the tanks of the van and rear-guard prevented total anihilation. The paras had, fortuitously, withdrawn down RC2 on the 16th November. Further such ambushes were sprung on the retreating CFEO during the next week, inflicting a total of around 1,200 casualties. French air-cover prevented even heavier losses.

While the CFEO had seized supplies, Giap quickly made up for these from his Chinese suppliers, and he was still in position to threaten Laos. While "Lorraine" was a well-conceived conventional operation, Giap had shown once more that he was far from being a conventional opponent! Salan had received a bloody nose, and Giap had lost virtually nothing.

Taking advantage of the situation, Giap counter-attacked and took two outposts (Ba Lay and Moc Chau). Then, in a misjudged movement, he ordered 308 Division to assault the position at Na San - where the remnants and isolated garrisons had retreated to a scratch-defensive position after the Nghia Lo debacle. However, the garrison had been reinforced and had fortified the camp with 3,500 mines and belts of wire. The garrison consisted of 3e BPC, 1er BEP, 2e BEP, III/3e REI, III/5e REI, two Tirailleur and two Vietnamese battalions, supported by artillery. The VM assault was launched on 23rd November. Fighting was heavy, but the VM had (for once) been mistaken about both the size and determination of the garrison. Despite strongpoints changing hands, the VM realised that the assault was futile and withdrew on the 3rd December. This was a morale-boosting success for the CFEO, but gave a false view that such air-supplied bases could be held against all-comers, even in the middle of enemy territory. (As this piece concerns "Lorraine", I have given only a brief account of Na San - I hope that we can write up a fuller description at some point).

Despite Na San, the autumn of 1952 was a great success for the VM, and acted as a springboard for the advance into Laos during 1953.

Captured Material from Phu Doan

There are two lists of the captured material from this base (seized by the paras in Operation Marion). One is from Bernard Fall, the other from General Yves Gras (both cited in Pierre Labrousse; "La Méthode Vietminh"):

 From General Gras:

250 tonnes of munitions

52 LMGs and MMGs

1,000 rifles

3 recoilless rifles

1 jeep

From Bernard Fall:

1 jeep

150 tonnes of munitions

1,500 rifles

100 MMGs

22 SMGs

30 LMGs

40 light mortars

14 medium mortars

2 heavy (120mm) mortars

23 bazookas

3 recoilless rifles

Notes on "Lorraine" and "Marion"

While I have used the abbreviation "VM" above for "Viet Minh", in fact by this time the Viet Minh had been renamed "Lien Viet". However, it is standard in Western accounts at least to keep the term "Viet Minh" for all Vietnamese communist guerrilla movements during the period 1945-54 at least.

Supplies were beginning to become more standardised at this time, and photos of 1er BEP troops in Operation Marion show most dressed in the French 1947 fatigues (camouflaged or not), with bush hat, US webbing, and armed with the US M1A1 carbine.

Sources :

LABROUSSE (Pierre), La méthode Vietminh : Indochine, 1945-1954, Paris : Charles Lavauzelle, 1996. ISBN 0-7025-0387-X

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Monday, November 20, 2023

 

French Amphibious Infantry Squadrons in Indochina

Military Organization > France > French Mounted Squadron on LVT (1953-55)

During the latter half of the First Indochina War in the early 1950s, the French employed 2 Amphibious Groups (Groupements amphibies) to cope with Vietnam's particularly inundated terrain. These brigade-sized formations were articulated in Amphibious Squadron Groups (Groupes d'escadrons amphibies) which consisted of 2 company-sized squadrons. These were either equipped with the American M29 Weasel, known as the "Crabes" in French, or the LVT-4 which will be the focus of this article. These were essentially French Foreign Legion-led, (mostly) Vietnamese manned, and LVT-mounted amphibious infantry.


This article will cover the organization and equipment of the Mounted Squadron on LVT (Escadron porte sur L.V.T.) based on 1954 tables of organization originally scanned by Risaldar Singh. This would have been roughly how squadrons were organized from mid-1953 when a reorganization occurred to 1955 when they were dissolved.


↓ Organization

Allocation: 1 per Amphibious Squadrons Group (Groupe d'escadrons amphibies) of the Amphibious Group (Groupement amphibie)

Type: Amphibious Infantry

Time Frame: 1954-55

Personnel: 3 Officers, 23 NCOs, 48 Enlisted (French Legionnaires); 8 NCOs, 171 Enlisted (Indigenous)

 

1× Squadron Commander (Legionnaire), Captain, armed with a pistol

1× Driver (Indigenous Troop), armed with a submachine gun


Vehicles:

1× Jeep, SCR-510 radio on-board.


Command & Services Platoon / Hors-Rang (47 OR)

1× Platoon Leader (Legionnaire), NCO, armed with a submachine gun

Command Group

6× Observer-Radio Operators (1 Legionnaire NCO, 1 Indigenous NCO, 2 Legionnaires, 2 Indigenous Troops) - Armed with 2 Submachine Guns, 2 Carbines and 2 Rifles

2× Medics (1 Legionnaire, 1 Indigenous Troop) - Armed with 2 Rifles

4× LVT-4A4 (75) Crewmen (2 Legionnaires, 2 Indigenous Troops) - Armed with 3 Pistols and 1 Submachine Gun


Vehicles:

2× Motorcycles

1× LVT-4A4 75mm amphibious assault gun: Armed with 1× 75mm Howitzer and 3× .30 cal machine guns. SCR-508 radio on-board.


Services Group

3× Legionnaire NCOs

5× Legionnaires

5× Indigenous Troops


Weapons:

• 1× Pistol

• 2× Submachine Guns

• 10× Rifles


Auto Group

1× Group Leader (Legionnaire NCO)

2× Legionnaire NCOs

5× Legionnaires

13× Indigenous Troops


Weapons:

• 2× Pistols

• 5× Submachine Guns

• 14× Rifles


Vehicles:

1× LVT-4 Recovery Vehicle: Armed with 1× .30 cal machine gun. SCR-508 radio on-board.

1× Jeep and 1-ton trailer (for Group Leader): Armed with 1× .30 cal machine gun

1× 1-ton Infantry Truck

1× 1-2-ton Truck

4× 2-4-ton Trucks

• 1× 1-ton trailer

• 2× 1-2-ton trailers

• 1× pack field kitchen

• 1× water tank trailer

 

3× Combat Platoons (1 OF, 54 OR in 1 platoon / 55 OR in 2 platoons)

1× Platoon Leader (Legionnaire), Lieutenant (in 1 platoon) or Adjutant / Adjutant-Chef (in 2 platoons), armed with a pistol


Command Group (Deputy / Radio Operators / Gunners)

1× Deputy Platoon Leader (Legionnaire), NCO

2× Legionnaires

2× Indigenous Troops


Weapons / Equipment:

• 2× Pistols (presumably for M20 gunners)

• 2× Submachine Guns

• 1× Carbine

• 1× M20 75mm Recoilless Rifle

• 1× SCR-625 mine detector


⁍ 2× Fusilier-Voltigeur Groups, each:

1× Group Leader (Legionnaire NCO)

1× Indigenous NCO

17× Indigenous Troops


Weapons:

• 1× Pistol (presumably for Automatic Rifle operator)

• 5× Submachine Guns

• 5× Carbines

• 5× Rifles

• 3× Rifles with Rifle Grenade Launchers

• 1× Automatic Rifle


⁍ 2× LVT Crews, each:

3× Legionnaires

3× Indigenous Troops


Vehicles:

1× LVT-4 amphibious carrier: Armed with 2× .50 cals and 2× .30 cals. 1 SCR-528 and 2 SCR-536 radios on-board


Weapons:

• 1× Pistol

• 2× Submachine Guns

• 3× Rifles

 

Support Platoon (1 OF, 35 OR)


1× Platoon Leader (Legionnaire), Lieutenant (in 1 platoon) or Adjutant / Adjutant-Chef (in 2 platoons), armed with a pistol


Command Group (Deputy / Radio Operators / Observers)

1× Deputy Platoon Leader (Legionnaire NCO)

2× Legionnaires

2× Indigenous Troops


Weapons / Equipment:

• 4× Submachine Guns

• 1× Carbine

• 2× AN/VRC-3 vehicle-mounted radios

• 1× SCR-508 radio

• 1× SCR-625 mine detector


Vehicle Group:

1× Legionnaire (NCO)

3× Legionnaires

1× Indigenous NCO

11× Indigenous Troops


Vehicles:

1× LVT-4 amphibious carrier: Armed with 2× .50 cal and 2× .30 cal machine guns. 1 SCR-528 and 2 SCR-536 radios on-board


Weapons:

• 4× Pistols

• 8× Submachine Guns

• 4× Carbines

• 2× 60mm Mortars

• 2× M18 57mm Recoilless Rifles

Cannon Group:

2× Legionnaire (NCO)

4× Legionnaires

8× Indigenous Troops


Vehicles:

2× LVT-4/40 amphibious fighting vehicles: Each armed with 1× 40mm Bofors and 2× .50 cal machine guns


Weapons:

• 2× Pistols

• 10× Submachine Guns

• 2× Carbines

• 1× AN/VRC-3 vehicle-mounted radio

• 1× SCR-508 radio

• 1× SCR-528 radio


 

↓ Discussion

The Mounted Squadron on LVT (Escadron porte sur LVT) was a component of France’s 2 Amphibious Groups (1er GA and 2e GA). These groups consisted of 2 or 3 Amphibious Squadron Groups (or Amphibious Sub-Groups / Sous-groupements Amphibies before 1953) that briefly existed in Indochina from 1951 to 1955. These were cavalry formations, almost entirely led by the French Foreign Legion.


Amphibious formations were intended to solve the problem of Vietnam’s particularly difficult “rice paddy” terrain. French units, including the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade (13e DBLE) and 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment (1er REC) had started to receive M-29 Weasels (called “Crabe” by the French) from American stocks in Manila in the late 1940s. These were later complemented by the LVT-4, which started to be integrated into French cavalry in 1950-1951. Amphibious Sub-Groups, based on 1 Crabe squadron, 1 platoon of 6 LVT-4s, and a company of infantry were formed in September 1951. This was a sort of “trinome” of Crabe cavalry (recon/security), LVT-4 firepower, and infantry (Nicholas). Around Tonkin in North Vietnam, the Crabes would often be used to cordon off fortified villages while the LVTs dropped off the infantry to assault (Aïcardi, 2013).

In 1953, the infantry companies and LVT platoons were consolidated, forming single squadrons. Additionally, the Amphibious Sub-Groups were renamed Amphibious Squadron Groups (Mathey), which signaled their formalization. While the 1er REC’s experiments in Saigon had an infantry company from the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade or 13e DBLE (who also originally tested the M29 Crabe in the mid-40s), these were supplanted by locally recruited Vietnamese soldiers. In September-October 1951, three companies of auxiliaries (compagnies de supplétifs militaires) were formed by the regiment to furnish the new Amphibious Groups (Aïcardi, 2013). The rationale was indigenous troops would know the terrain better and be better received to the local population (Pelissier, 2021, p. 9). The injection of manpower was also significant, as unlike in Algeria (which was legally considered part of France) conscripts could not serve in Indochina.


The 2 Amphibious Groups in Vietnam were mainly manned by the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment (1er REC). The 1st Amphibious Group (1e GA), initially at Saigon and later Tourane (Da Nang), had three sub-groups/squadron groups from 1er REC (de Bressy). The 2nd Amphibious Group (2e GA), formed in Tonkin, had 2 Squadron Groups, one under 1er REC and the other under the 1st Mounted Chasseurs (1er RCC) that was later replaced by a 1er REC squadrons group in June1953 (Aïcardi, 2013).

  • 1st Amphibious Group (1er GA) as of June 1953:

  • 2nd Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry

  • 3rd Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry

  • 7th Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry (Replaced 1st Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry in June 1953)

  • 2nd Amphibious Group (2e GA) as of June 1953:

  • 4th Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry

  • 1st Squadrons Group, 1st Foreign Cavalry (Replaced 6th Squadrons Group, 1st Chasseurs in June 1953

By the end of the war, 1er REC had 3 headquarters squadrons, 14 combat squadrons and over 3,000 men, articulated as an Armored Regiment (with M8 Greyhounds, Half-Tracks, M5 Tanks, M24 Chaffees) and 2 Amphibious Groups (Aïcardi, 2013).


The 1st Amphibious Group was ultimately dissolved in 1955 with the French pull-out of Vietnam. However, the 2nd Amphibious Group left for Morocco and was integrated into the 2nd Foreign Cavalry Regiment in November 1955 as the Mounted Squadrons Group (Groupe d'Escadrons Portés, GEP). It included the 1st, 8th, and 11th Squadrons of 1er REC, which became the GEP staff, 4th Squadron (M8 Greyhound) and 5th Squadron (Scout Car) of 2e REC. This was in addition to the squadron’s pre-existing Command Service Squadron (ECS), 1st Reconnaissance Squadron (M8 Greyhound), and 2nd and 3rd Tank Squadrons (AMX-13, which replaced the M3A3 light tank in 1954). However, the staff and 4th Squadrons were dissolved in April-May 1956 after Morocco’s independence and the regiment’s resettlement in Algeria. The 5th Squadron becoming the new 4th Squadron, 2e REC (foreignlegion.info; Détachement de Légion étrangère de Mayotte).

 

The LVT-4 was a suitable vehicle for the flooded and riverine terrain that characterized much of Vietnam. They complemented the M-29 “Crabe” originally bought from the Americans in 1945. However, those were only semi-amphibious, and in a tough spot could require crews to pull their vehicles through certain terrain (or even abandon and destroy them). The LVT by contrast was fully amphibious. Additionally, while the Crabe was used mainly for reconnaissance, raids and cordoning, and thus didn’t have a huge dismount capacity, the LVT-4 squadrons were more in the French tradition of mounted pseudo-infantry cavalrymen that rode jeeps, half-tracks, and Dodge 1.5-ton trucks alongside light armor in other types of squadrons. This provided a large dismount element for search and destroy missions and close combat. LVT units also had heavier weaponry, with self-propelled 75mm assault howitzers, 40mm Bofors, vehicle-mounted .50 cals, and additional light weapons.

Table of organization originally scanned by Risaldar Singh.

The Mounted Squadron (LVT) consisted of a 1 Command & Services Platoon (Peloton hors-rang), 3 Combat Platoons (Pelotons de combat), and 1 Support Platoon (Peloton d’appui). There were a total of 7 LVT-4s (standard carrier), 2 LVT-4/40s (with 40mm Bofors), 1 LVT-4A4 (with a 75mm howitzer), and 1 LVT-4 recovery vehicle per squadron, plus 253 men and other vehicles. Of these, 179 or 71% of the men were indigenous Vietnamese while the rest were a Foreign Legion cadre. This compared to Crabe squadrons, where about half of personnel were Vietnamese.


The Command and Services Platoon (Peloton hors-rang, PHR) included a Command Group, Services Group, and Auto Group. The Squadron Commander, administratively separate from the platoon, had his own jeep with a driver, but also an 75mm howitzer-armed LVT in the Command Group (Pelissier, 2021, p. 9). The Command Group also included the squadron’s recovery vehicle. The balance of the squadron’s trucks and field kitchen were kept in the Auto Group. This constituted the bulk of the trains in the whole Amphibious Group organization, as neither the Amphibious Squadrons Group headquarters nor the Amphibious Group had significant organic sustainment.

The 3 Combat Platoons meanwhile consisted of a Command Group (with the Deputy, Radio Operators and 75mm recoilless rifle gunners), 2 Fusilier-Voltigeur Groups (rather larger infantry components), and 2 LVT-4s to mechanize them. The FV Groups had about equal splits of submachine guns, carbines, and rifles, as well as 1 automatic rifle (FM 24/29 type). The LVT-4s are each manned by 6 troops (6 listed in the TO&E) and armed with 2 heavy machine guns (M2 .50 cal) and 2 “light” machine guns (M1919A4). According to Pelissier, the crew included a commander (chef de voiture), driver (pilote), assistant driver, radio operator, and four gunners (2 more than the TO&E lists). Although de Bressy (2014) referenced a 6-man crew consistent with the TO&E. The LVT-4 could carry 25 troops operationally or 40 administratively (Pelissier, 2021, p. 9).


Lastly, the Support Platoon included the Platoon Leader and his Command Group, the Vehicle/Equipment(?) Group (Groupe engins) and Cannon Group. Groupe engins was mounted in an LVT-4 and equipped with 2 60mm mortars and 2 57mm recoilless rifles. The Cannon Group meanwhile had 2 LVT-4/40s armed with 40mm Bofors autocannons. However, these may have been 75mm howitzer-armed LVTs at some point, as referenced by de Bressy, and Pelissier states that the 40mm-armed LVTs may not have existed in all Mounted Squadrons.


↓ Sources

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