What started out a one Special Forces 'camp' in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam (I Corps) grew into a group of ten (or eleven) "A-teams" in fortified encampments placed at strategic points in the I Corps Operational Area (AO).

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A-Teams in I Corps

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The Special Forces camps in Viet Nam were maintained principally for training CIDG and gathering of intelligence.  Some of our camps were hand-me-downs, so to speak.  The camp at Gia Vuc (A-103) was a remnant of the French occupation days.  Other camps were built as needed.  Some camps, such as the camp at A Shau Valley, we lost to enemy action.  (The battle over the Special Forces camp at A Shau resulted in the Congressional Medal of Honor for Capt. MacDonald.)

A-109 and A-103...

Thuong Duc lay west and slightly south of Da Nang, while Gia Vuc is located at the extreme southern end of I Corps. (Both locations are highlighted on the map.) Notice that the region called Annam Highlands encompasses the left-third of the map.  This is the area I refer to as the 'high plateau'. Approximately half-way between Gia Vuc and Thuong Duc is Ngoc Linh.  At 8500+ feet above sea level it is one of the highest points in Viet Nam.

The camp at Thuong Duc lay just east of A Shau Valley -- the route of the Ho Chi Minh trail.  During our orientation upon arrival at Thuong Duc, we were provided E&E instructions.  (E&E referred to Escape and Evasion -- 'plan B' if the camp were ever overrun.)  Basically, we were told to E&E (make our way) east and try to establish contact with friendly forces.   E&E south?  That was okay, too.  E&E to the north?  Not a problem.  But don't EVER E&E west!  Once across the ridge to the west, we counted the NVA in division strength -- not company strength! In the event our camp (A-109) was about to be overrun, the last person out was supposed to radio Da Nang for 'neutralization fire'.   "What the hell is neutralization fire?" I asked.  The captain smiled and said that the big WW II battleships lay literally right off the coast.  "You know, these are the ships with the sixteen-inch guns!"  These ships will lay on a fire mission for our camp's map coordinates and put a barrage of 16" shells right smack in the middle of our compound.  "That means it will rain 1-ton shells right where we are standing."  Thankfully... we never had to test this part of our evacuation plan. 

Sorry... I got a little distracted there.  Back to the subject of A-Team camps.

In order to gather this intelligence they positioned our camps at remote sites near strategic travelways.  (Like A Shau Valley)   The only way in or out of these camps was by air.  Many times the choppers would leave Da Nang and stop at several camps, dropping off men, mail, and small supplies.   The stops at other camps provided a quick opportunity to snap one or two photos of these camps.  Therefore, I present my quick photos of Special Forces camps A-107, A-104, and A-108.

A-104 Ha Thanh

Don't get airsick as we spiral in over the camp!

Pop quiz!

Why would the chopper come in high over the camp and spiral down to land?

To avoid 'ground fire'
-- VC shooting at the chopper from the ground!

A-107 Tra Bong

Camp A-107 was located almost due north of Gia Vuc. (See map above)

In typical SF fashion it was basically a camp within a camp.

Notice the system of trenches to allow protected travel between locations in the camp.

A-107 Tra Bong

A more oblique view of Special Forces camp A-107. Notice the proximity to the river.

Team members 'popped smoke' for the in-bound chopper. (Reddish area right of center)

A-108 Minh Long

Looks like the early days at A-108, although I do not remember the camp as 'being built' during this timeframe.

The photo may have been taken at a less-than-optimum angle. It does look like the air strip is just being built and I do not see any 'mature' fortifications in the photo.

Notice surrounding terrain.

Well... you've gotten a quick view of several other Special Forces camps in I Corps. For a peek at a III Corps Special Forces camp (A-342), go to the III Corps page in the Vietnam Info section of SouthEast Asia menu. You will be able to contrast their camp (and terrain) with that of the I Corps camps.

 Special Forces Camps In I Corps: SF Camp Minh Long, A-108 The "old" I Corps Special Forces camp at Minh Long started 15 Feb 66. Like many A-camps in I Corps, Camp Minh Long was the result of the work of many A-teams. A proposed camp at Hiep Duc was scheduled for opening o/a/ July, 1966. When A Shau was overrun, A7/15, which had transferred to 5th SFGA, was already established at Tien Phuoc. As the A Shau team became available, it was put into Tien Phuoc and the team at Gia Vuc A-103 was re-designated A-108 and transferred to Minh Long, which had been opened by A-110 (see A-110). Minh Long was located in Minh Long District, Quang Ngai Province. ; Camp Minh Long moved to its "new" location 25 Aug 66. The camp converted to ARVN Rangers Mar 70.

Minh Long is located in the Phuoc Giang River valley about 23 kilometers south-southwest of Quang Ngai City.

On the morning of 06 March 1967 a patrol from the Special Forces camp, led by two US soldiers, operating in the valley about 8 kilometers north of the Minh Long airfield was ambushed by a much larger VC force. The South Vietnamese irregulars broke under the attack and scattered. A reaction force was promptly dispatched under command of Master Sergeant Joseph Sanchez with Staff Sergeant Michael Stearns as his second-in-command. On arrival in the area they rounded up about 30 members of the original patrol and set them to securing a landing zone in preparation for reinforcements. When MSG Sanchez thought he had enough troops - about 60 men all told - the force set off area of engagement. They had moved only about 500 meters when they too came under heavy attack. These troops held but were forced to withdraw from the killing zone. After they had pulled back a short distance, MSG Sanchez realized SSG Stearns and two Vietnamese sergeants were missing - and he went back after them. He was killed while trying to reach them.

At this point there were four missing Americans, two from the original patrol and two from the reaction force:

• MSG Thomas J. Sanchez, Pasadena, CA (Dist Svc Cross)

• SSG Jacob G. Roth

• SSG Michael F. Stearns, San Francisco, CA (Silver Star)

• SP4 Burt C. Small, Savannah, GA

SSG Roth was rescued on 06 March. On 07 March a CIDG patrol captured a Montagnard soldier who, when interrogated, acknowledged being a part of the ambush force and said that one American had been captured. When the bodies of MSG Sanchez and SSG Stearns were recovered on 09 March it was clear that SP4 Small had been captured.

Searches of the area were not successful - the VC had withdrawn into the mountains, taking SP4 Small with them - and he was never seen again. Small was carried as Missing in Action until 31 Oct 1977, when the Secretary of the Army approved a Presumptive Finding of Death. His remains have not been repatriated.

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Dylan Max

I hope someone sees this because I have been there! I am currently in the process of creating a short documentary about traveling there because my father, Richard served there. If anyone is interested inseeing the footage, please DM me. Take care. Here is a photo of me having dinner with a woman that was lived near A-108. She knew my father.

• 4y
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I Corps Mike Force History Page

I well remember the battles in March 1967 at Minh Long. I was at Gia Vuc, a Special Forces camp south of Minh Long, monitoring radio transmissions of the on-going situation at Minh Long. My wife had already departed the U.S. for Hawaii and I was on my last possible day to try to get transportation from Gia Vuc to Danang so that I might catch a flight to Hawaii to meet my wife. Fortunately, an Air Force FAC departing the Minh Long AO agreed to divert and pick me up on the Gia Vuc airstrip before returning to Danang. Thanks to him I got to Danang around 1800-1900 hrs and departed the next morning at 0600 hours.

• 10y
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